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We investigate bank loans’ specialness with a particular focus on the recent boom and bust 
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We  find  a  significant  and  negative  reaction  to  bank  loan  announcements  which  is  mostly 
driven by loan provided during the crisis period. We also document significant changes in bank 
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1.  Introduction 
The ongoing  economic  and  financial  turmoil  that  started  in 2007  has (again)  put  financial 
institutions in the center of harsh debate and massive critics, in particular with respect to their 
role in fuelling and propagating the crisis as well as in provoking a credit crunch. Indeed, 
according to Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) and Purnanandam (2011), banks had gradually relaxed 
their screening and monitoring standards before the crisis, especially in the US sub-prime 
mortgage  market.  Then,  they  sharply  curtailed  new  credit  and  forced  firms  to  reduce 
investments hence propagating the financial crisis to the real economy (Duchin et al. 2010; 
Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010; Santos 2011). 
These findings are somehow disturbing because according to the seminal contributions 
by Diamond (1984, 1991) and Fama (1985), financial  intermediaries play a specific role in 
managing the problems resulting from imperfect information on firms, and are considered as 
efficient in evaluating, screening and monitoring borrowers.  Hence, banks are believed to 
produce valuable information regarding borrower’s risk profile and quality. Thus bank loan 
announcement  should  convey  valuable  information  to  the  market  about  the  borrower’s 
financial situation, and the market response to bank loan announcement should be positive. 
Empirical evidence tends to support the view that bank loans are thus “special” according to 
several  authors  (James  1987;  Lummer  and  McConnell  1989;  Preece  and  Mullineaux  1996; 
Focarelli et al. 2008), who find positive and significant abnormal returns for borrower’s stocks 
around the date of a bank loan announcement. 
However, recent empirical evidence seems to question the “specialness” of bank loans. 
Billett et al. (2006) find that bank loans are not  special at all when abnormal returns are 
estimated  over  a  longer  period  while  Fields  et  al.  (2006)  suggest  the  diminishing  market 
reaction to bank loan announcement is consistent with the dramatic change in the financial 
market. The results of event studies performed on samples from emerging markets even show  
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negative abnormal returns for bank loan announcements (Bailey et al. 2011 and Hwuang et al. 
2011 for China and Godlewski et al. 2011 for Russia). 
Bank loan signaling and certification role might be even more crucial during episodes 
of boom and bust such as the most recent one starting in the aftermath of the Internet bubble 
followed by the financial turmoil of 2007-2008. Indeed, de Haas and van Horen (2010) show 
that  banks  tighten  screening  and  monitoring  during  a  financial  crisis  when  information 
asymmetries  are  exacerbated.  Furthermore,  empirical  evidence  from  different  episodes  of 
crisis around the world (South-East Asia, Russia or Norway) show that the adverse shocks to 
banks also affect their borrowers’ performance (Bae et al. 2002; Ongena et al. 2003; Chava and 
Purnanandam 2011). 
Moreover, these issues are even more important regarding the largest market for large 
external  corporate  financing  in  terms  of  bank  debt:  the  syndicated  lending  market
1.  Its 
development provides a representative proxy for the boom and bust cycle (see Figure 1 for 
2005-2011) with 2 trillion USD and 5000 issues in 2001, then 4.5 trillion USD and 9000 issues in 
2007, and  again  2.75  trillion  and  5000  issues  in  2010.  Furthermore,  due  to the  particular 
structure of syndicated loans, issues related to informational frictions are more complicated 
and sever in such a setting. Private information available to some lenders creates an adverse 
selection problem while moral hazard problem may arise when the participant banks delegate 
some  monitoring  tasks  to  the  lead  bank.  Finally,  if  we  establish  a  parallel  between  loan 
syndication  and  securitization
2,  we  can  also  wonder  if  such  techniques  have  reduced  the 
incentives of lenders to properly perform their screening duties, as shown by Mian and Sufi 
(2009) and Keys et al. (2010) in the case of loan securitization. 
                                                           
1 A syndicated loan is granted by a pool of banks composed of lead (arrangers) and participant banks 
that provide funding to a borrower under a single agreement. 
2 A securitization does not change the contract between the borrower and the original lender. Instead a 
new contract is created by the lender and a third party to sell the cash flow from the underlying loan. In 
a  syndicated  loan,  all  lenders  are  and  remain  part  of  one  loan  contract  with  the  borrower,  but, 





This market provides an excellent ground to investigate our main research question: 
are bank loans (still) special, especially during a crisis? We aim here at revisiting the issue of 
bank loan “specialness” with a particular focus on the recent boom and bust cycle. To do so we 
perform an empirical investigation of stock market reactions to bank loan announcements for 
French companies using event study methodology. We then perform empirical test of loan, 
bank  syndicate  and  borrower  characteristics  influencing  stock  market  reaction.  We  also 
investigate if the stock market perception is different over the boom and bust period and to 
which loan, syndicate, and borrower characteristics this perception is sensitive. 
We focus on the French syndicated lending market for several reasons. First of all, next 
to deals for US companies, syndicated loans to French companies are premanently listed in the 
top global deals. For instance, during the first semester of 2011, among the 5 top deals ranging 
from 15 to 25 billion USD, French company CADES raised 16.6 billion USD through a syndicated 
deal. Second, our focus on the French syndicated lending market is motivated by its specific 
features, as bank syndicates lending to French companies are larger and less concentrated 
when compared to syndicates in the US or the UK (Godlewski 2009). Third, recent concerns 
regarding French banks liquidity and solvency with respect to the Eurozone sovereign debt 
crisis
3 appeal for a better understanding of stock market perception of bank lending decisions 
in this area. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. We present the relevant literature in 
section 2. Section 3 is devoted to the description of the data and methodology. Results are 
displayed and discussed in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes the article. 
2.  Related literature 
In this section, we survey the relevant literature dealing with bank lending, the “specialness” of 
bank loans and the syndicated lending market. We also discuss the impact of boom and bust 
cycles on bank behavior. 
                                                           
3 “What's  the  Matter  With  the  French  Banks?”,  The  Wall  Street  Journal,  13/9/2011;  “Moody's 
Downgrade: SocGen, Credit Agricole's Liquidity Problems Larger Than Greece”, Forbes, 14/9/2011  
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2.1.  The “specialness” of bank loans 
There is a consensus in the literature that bank loans are significantly different from other 
forms of external corporate finance. Indeed, financial intermediation theory argues that banks 
are unique institutions because they gain insider information and knowledge on firms through 
lending  and  deposit  relationships  (Fama  1985;  Diamond  1991).  Hence,  the  traditional 
informational view of bank loans argues that banks, as large creditors, can produce private 
information  about  borrowing  firms  through  initial  screening  and  monitoring.  Therefore, 
lending decisions reveal positive private information about the firms because banks would 
lend to high-quality borrowers, rather than to those of low-quality, to maximize the value of 
the loans. 
A  large  body  of  empirical  research  shows  that  announcements  of  bank  loan 
agreements are associated with positive abnormal returns for borrowers on average. In other 
words, stock markets treat bank loan financing as good news and bank loan announcements 
therefore convey positive information regarding borrower’s conditions. Indeed, bank loans, or 
debt  more  generally,  can  create  value  by  reducing  overinvestment  by  non-congruent 
professional managers (Jensen and Meckling 1976) or by giving a manager the opportunity to 
signal the quality of the firm and his willingness to be monitored by lenders (Diamond 1991; 
Godlewski et al. 2010)
4.  
Thus, bank loans are considered as special, starting with the seminal work of James 
(1987) who finds a sizeable average excess return following announcements that firms have 
signed a bank loan agreement. Many further studies confirm and refine this result. Lummer 
and McConnell (1989) report signiﬁcant average excess returns for favorable loan revision 
announcements while Slovin et al. (1992) show that bank loan announcements are particularly 
good news for firms with severe information asymmetry, such as small firms. According to Best 
                                                           
4 In  contrast,  announcements  of  SEO  (seasoned  equity  offerings)  generate  an  average  negative 
abnormal  return,  whereas  announcements  of  public  bond  issues  generate  zero  or  slightly  negative 
equity returns, according to previous research.  
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and Zhang (1993), firms that face greater earnings uncertainty and lack sufficient evaluation 
and monitoring by other stakeholders benefit most from bank loan announcements. Higher 
positive excess returns following loan announcements are also associated with more reputable 
lenders (Billett et al. 1995). 
Overall, an empirical consensus seems to emerge from previous research regarding 
bank  loans’  specialness  as  certification  and  signaling  device  regarding  borrowers’  quality. 
However, there also exists empirical evidence showing that bank loan announcements can be 
considered as bad news with negative abnormal returns (Billett et al. 2006). Such findings are 
particularly frequent in the case of emerging market economies (Bailey et al. 2011; Christophe 
J. Godlewski et al. 2011; Weihua Huang et al. 2011). These recent findings may question the 
empirical consensus in favor of bank specialness. 
2.2.  Syndicated loans 
In 2010, more than 2.75 trillion USD of debt had been raised on the worldwide syndicated 
lending  market,  representing  a  significant  portion  of  external  financing  for  companies 
(Thomson Reuters 2010). Furthermore, already 1.9 trillion USD has been raised during the first 
semester of 2011, an increase of almost 50% as compared to the first half of the year 2010.  
In a nutshell, the transaction process of bank loan syndication can be divided into 
three  main  stages
5.  During  the  pre-mandated  stage,  after  soliciting  competitive  offers  to 
arrange the syndication from one or more banks (usually the main relationship banks), the 
borrower  chooses  one  or  more  arrangers  that  are  mandated  to  form  a  syndicate  and 
negotiates a preliminary loan agreement. The arranger is responsible for negotiating the key 
loan  terms  with  the  borrower,  appointing  the  participants  and  structuring  the  syndicate. 
During  the  post-mandated  stage,  the  arranger  prepares  an  information  memorandum  for 
potential syndicate members, containing information about the borrower's creditworthiness 
and  the  loan  terms.  The  presentation  and  discussion  of  the  content  of  the  information 
                                                           
5 See Esty (2001) for a detailed presentation of the bank loan syndication process.  
8 
 
memorandum,  as  well  as  the  announcement  of  closing  fees  and  the  establishment  of  a 
timetable for commitments and closing are done during a road show. Then, the arranger sends 
formal invitations to potential participants and determines the allocation for each participant. 
Finally, the operational post-signing stage takes place after the completion date when the deal 
becomes active and the loan is operational, binding the borrower and the syndicate members 
by the debt contract. 
The  benefits  of  loan  syndication  for  lenders,  such  as  portfolio  risk  and  sources  of 
revenues diversification, and borrowers, mostly lower costs as compared to bond issues or a 
series of bilateral loans, largely explain the success of syndicated lending. However, syndicated 
loans have their drawbacks because the nature of a syndicated loan may expose the banking 
pool’s members to the adverse consequences of informational frictions and potential agency 
costs. 
First, private information about the borrower can create adverse selection problems, 
as  the  arranger  may  be  inclined  to  syndicate  loans  for  unreliable  borrowers.  Second, 
participating banks may delegate monitoring to the arranger, but the banks are not in the loop 
as to what the arranger is doing, which might result in situations of moral hazard. Third, the 
borrower's financial distress is an important factor in syndication as it is more complicated to 
reorganize  and  reformulate  the  agreement  for  the borrower  because  a  collective  decision 
needs to be taken by the lenders (Bolton and Scharfstein 1996). 
Nevertheless, a syndicated loan embeds both features of bank lending: transactional 
and relationship (Altunbas et al. 2006). It is therefore also potentially “special” as any bank 
loan and most of empirical research tends to show that it is true. Indeed, loans generate 
positive abnormal returns and consequently are special when they are made by syndicates 
with fewer lenders (Preece and Mullineaux 1996) or with larger portions of the loan retained 
by  arrangers  (Focarelli  et  al.  2008).  The  latter  characteristic  seems  to  be  an  important  
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syndication  feature  especially  during  periods  of  economic  and  financial  uncertainty  and 
consequently lead us to discuss the issue of bank behavior during boom and bust periods. 
2.3.  Bank lending during boom and bust periods 
Much of the research on bank lending behavior, qualified as procyclicality in a boom and bust 
framework,  has  focused  on  credit  crunches  during  business  cycle  downturns.  Several 
hypotheses for these crunches were tested and partially validate. Hence, it appears that credit 
crunches can be explained by reduced risk taking by banks (Wagster 1999; Furfine 2001), 
implementation of tougher regulatory capital standards (Berger and Udell 1994; Hancock et al. 
1995)  or  increasing  supervisory  toughness  (Peek  and  Rosengren  1995;  Gambacorta  and 
Mistrulli 2004), as well as reduced loan demand  (Bernanke et al. 1991).  
More recently, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) argue that banks may loosen their 
lending standards and thus lead to deteriorated loan portfolios, lower profits, and expanded 
aggregate credit because information asymmetries decrease during economic growth periods. 
With respect to the most recent episode of boom and bust, Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011) 
find that the quality of loans deteriorated for six consecutive years before the crisis and that 
securitizers were aware of it. Hence, the rise and fall of the subprime mortgage market follows 
a classic lending boom-bust scenario.  
De Haas and van Horen (2010) provide additional evidence regarding bank lending 
behavior during the global financial crisis by analyzing changes in the structure of syndicated 
loans. They find an increase in retention rates among syndicate arrangers during the crisis, 
especially in the case of important information asymmetries between the borrower and the 
syndicate  or  within  the  syndicate.  They  interpret  their  findings  as  a  “wake-up  call”  with 
increased screening and monitoring by banks during the bust period starting in 2007.  
Following these results, we can expect that such reaction in bank lending behavior 
should translate in even more important certification and signaling role of bank loans and 
hence their “specialness” during  a  crisis.  We  could observe  the  absence or  even  negative  
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reaction during the boom phase of the cycle and then positive reaction during the bust cycle if 
investors believe in a “wake-up call” of banks. However, we may also obtain an opposite result 
with stock markets sanctioning bank loan announcements perceived as signals of borrower 
weakness during economic and financial turmoil. Indeed, and in particular on the syndicated 
lending market, troubled borrowers could be the first to ask for bank debt funding, especially 
in the form of credit lines. 
3.  Empirical design 
In this section, we provide a description of the data and relevant descriptive statistics, followed 
by an explanation of the methodology. 
3.1.  Data 
Data  on  equity  prices,  loan  and  syndicate  characteristics  and  borrower  balance  sheet  for 
French companies over the 2000-2009 timespan are extracted via the Bloomberg Professional 
Terminal Server. Bloomberg provides detailed information on the terms of loan agreements, 
the composition and structure of the lending syndicate and accounting data for the borrowing 
companies. The main filter we apply concerns stock price availability over at least 150 trading 
days  before  the  date  of  loan  announcement.  Additional  filters  concern  syndicate 
characteristics and balance sheet data availability. The final full sample contains 253 bank loan 
announcements, each for a unique company, a figure which is within the range of events in 
previous studies (from 117 to 728) as reported by Maskara and Mullineaux (2011). 
  Table 1 provides summary descriptive statistics for main loan, syndicate and balance 
sheet variables for the full sample. Overall, syndicated loans for French borrowers are large 
(almost 700 MLN USD) with a maturity of almost three years and a spread close to 130 bps 
over Libor or Euribor. A typical loan facility is composed of more than two tranches
6. Half of 
                                                           
6 Syndicated loans can be “tranched” into heterogeneous components that can then  be distributed 
across lenders differentiated by their risk aversion. This technique is somehow close to tranching in a 
securitization process.  
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the loans are term loans and 40% are revolving loans. One out of five loans is secured and has 
covenants. 
Bank syndicates are composed of almost nine lenders of which an important part bear 
arranger titles (such as lead or mandated arranger). More than 2/3 of lenders are French banks 
and we observe a similar figure for the arranging banks. We remark that figures for league 
table lenders
7 are very similar to those for French banks (actually, French banks in the sample 
are often listed on Bloomberg League tables). 
The sample contains large firms with respect to their balance sheet or market value as 
well as their sales (40 BLN USD, 35 BLN USD, and 8 BLN USD respectively). Common equity and 
total debt ratios represent 1/3 of total assets, while financial leverage, measured with the total 
debt to common equity ratio, equals two. EBITDA amounts for more than 10% of interest 
expenses. Firms are relatively liquid according to the quick and current ratios, with a good 
profitability with respect to operational and profitability margins as well as return on assets. 
Overall, these figures suggest a good quality of the firms’ in our sample. 
3.2.  Methodology 
The market model, which relates the return of a given stock to the return of the market index, 
is  used  to  estimate  abnormal  returns  around the  event  date  i.e.  the  date of  a  bank  loan 
announcement (see MacKinlay 1997 for a survey). The date of announcement is taken as day 
0. It is necessary to make sure that there is no other corporate news that could influence stock 
returns within an event window. We check carefully and find no contamination caused by 
other events around our event dates.  
Returns are defined in the standard way as    [ ( )/ (  − 1)] × 100, where  ( ) is 
the daily closing stock market price at time  . To proxy the market return, we use the SBF 250 
                                                           
7 We consider a lender to be part of the league table if  it is  listed as one of the  first 25 financial 
institutions  in  the  Bloomberg  Underwriter  Rankings  Table,  computed  according  to  lender’s  market 
share, amount issued and number of issues between 2000 and 2009 for the European Market. We 
choose the 25




8. The market model parameters are estimated over the period (-100, -10). 
Similar results are obtained when using longer estimation periods up to 150 trading days, and 
ending the estimation period up to 30 days before the event date.  
Following previous studies (see Maskara and Mullineaux 2011 for a summary), we 
examine  seven  different  event  windows:  three  symmetric  ones  (one-day  [0,0],  three-days 
[−1,+1], five-days [−2,+2]) and four asymmetric ones (two-days [-1,0]; [0,1] and three-days [-
2,0];  [0,2]).  The  latter,  especially  [-1,0]  and  [-2,0], serve  also  the  purpose of  verifying  the 
existence of potential information leakage. We use standard OLS regressions to estimate the 
market model with an average R² (not reported) close to 15%. For each event window, we 
calculate  average  abnormal  standardized,  as  well  as  non-standardized,  daily  returns.  We 
obtain  respectively  cumulative  average  abnormal  returns  (CAAR)  and  cumulative  average 
standardized abnormal returns (CASAR)
9 by summing daily excess returns over the respective 
event windows.  
Then we perform t-tests to investigate the statistical significance of CAAR and CASAR 
with the null hypothesis being that the CAAR or CASAR equals 0. We also perform similar tests 
(t-test or chi²-test depending on the nature of the variable under consideration) to investigate 
the statistical significance of differences in various loan, syndicate and borrower variables with 
respect  to  positive  and  negative  CAAR.  Finally,  we  repeat  the  tests  with  respect  to  two 
different periods of our sample: before and after the crisis. Following de Haas and van Horen 
(2010), we define the period between January 2000 and August 2007 as the No crisis period 
while the period from September 2007 to December 2009 is considered as the Crisis period. 
Again we test the statistical significance of CAAR and CASAR as well as of various variables with 
respect to positive and negative CAAR for the Crisis and No crisis sub-periods. 
                                                           
8 Our results do not change when using CAC 40 or SBF 120 stock index but provide lower statistical 
quality of the regressions (R² lower than 10%).  
9 We standardize CAAR using the square root of the product of the number of days in the event window 
and the mean square error.  
13 
 
4.  Results 
In this section, we present and discuss the results regarding stock market perception of bank 
loan  announcements  for  the  full  sample  and  for  the  boom  and  bust  periods.  We  also 
investigate loan, syndicate and borrower characteristics related to positive and negative stock 
market reaction. 
4.1.  Full sample results 
We  first  present  our  main  results  regarding  stock  market  perception  of  bank  loan 
announcements  over  the  full  time  span  of  the  sample  in  Table  2.  We  remark  that  the 
perception  is  positive  in  40%  to  50%  of  loan  announcements.  Nevertheless,  we  observe 
systematically negative stock market reaction but only significant for three event windows: [-
2,0], [-1,0] and [0,0], with approximately -0.30 for CAAR and ranging from -0.07 to -0.09 for 
CASAR. We conclude that bank debt financing through a syndicated loan by French companies 
is considered as a negative signal by the stock market. We reach similar conclusions when 
using alternative t statistics such as Patell (1976) or Boehmer et al. (1991). Furthermore, we 
can  also  claim that  some  form of  information  leakage  seems  to  be  at  work  as  significant 
reaction is observed for windows before the loan announcement event.  
This first series of results do not confirm previous findings that bank loans are special 
(James 1987; Lummer and McConnell 1989; Preece and Mullineaux 1996; Focarelli et al. 2008). 
We rather provide empirical support for conclusions reached by Billett et al. (2006), Fields et 
al. (2006), Bailey et al. (2011), Godlewski et al. (2011) and Hwuang et al. (2011). In the French 
case, bank loan announcements are considered as bad news by the stock market refuting 
bank’s specialness arguments as well as certification and signaling role of bank debt financing.  
We can argue that such negative reaction is based on the agency costs resulting from 
the conflicts of interest between shareholders and debtholders, in particular banks. Indeed, 
shareholders  are  tempted  to  take  actions  that  benefit  themselves  at  the  expense  of 
debtholders and do not maximize firm value. This divergence of interests manifests itself in  
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two forms of moral hazard. First, it gives incentives to shareholders to invest in riskier projects 
than those preferred by debtholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Such “asset substitution” 
comes from the asymmetry of gains for shareholders. Second, as demonstrated by Myers 
(1977), conflicts between shareholders and debtholders lead to underinvestment. Thus, the 
agency costs resulting from the conflicts of interest between shareholders and debtholders 
suggest  that  greater  debt  may  enhance  moral  hazard  behavior  that  can  be  perceived 
negatively  by  stock  markets.  Another  type  of  explanation  can  be  related  the  conflicts  of 
interest between minor and major shareholders. Indeed, as recently shown by Huang et al. 
(2011),  bank  inefficiency  can  reduce  the  value  of  borrowers  when  expropriation  risk  of 
minority shareholders by controlling shareholders is a major concern. 
However, further investigation is needed to better understand these results and verify 
which features of the loan contract, the syndicate and the borrower play a significant role in 
shaping stock market reaction. In what follows we focus on the most significant CAAR using 
the [-1,0] window
10. We aim now at investigating those characteristics that are associated with 
a positive stock market reaction. To do so we perform t-tests or chi²-tests (depending on the 
continuous nature or not of the variable) on the difference of various variables with respect to 
a dummy equal to 1 if the CAAR [-1,0] is positive, and equal to 0 if the CAAR [-1,0] is negative. 
The results are displayed in Table 3. 
Regarding  loan  characteristics,  we  observe  that  the  only  significant  feature  is  the 
facility amount. The stock market reaction is positive for larger loans, actually twice as large as 
loans with negative CAAR. This result can be linked to our findings regarding bank syndicate 
characteristics, as we remark that larger syndicates with fewer local lenders are associated 
with positive CAAR. Regarding firm characteristics, we remark that significant differences in 
stock market reaction are essentially related to firm size measured with total assets and sales.  
                                                           
10 All results are similar when using other less significant windows as well as CASAR.  
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According to these results, the French stock market considers that large loans, funded 
by large syndicates of which a smaller proportion is composed of local banks, are a positive 
signal. Indeed, a larger loan funded by a more diffuse syndicate can be considered as a good 
signal regarding borrower’s quality. The size of the loan can be interpreted as reinforcing the 
certification and signaling role of the bank lending decision (Mosebach 1999) while a larger 
syndicate  is  usually  associated  with  less  informational  frictions  and  their  subsequent 
consequences in terms of adverse selection and moral hazard in the relationship between the 
borrower and the lenders (Lee and Mullineaux 2004; Sufi 2007; Bosch and Steffen 2011). The 
presence of numerous lenders can also serve as a device to mitigate eventual liquidity risk in 
funding the loan to the borrower as well as a risk diversification device, in particular when 
funding a large loan (Gatev and Strahan 2009). However, the result regarding syndicate size 
does not confirm previous results by Preece and Mullineaux (1996) who show, using a sample 
of  bank  loans  provided  to  US  borrowers,  a  positive  reaction  to  loans  funded  by  smaller 
syndicates. This can also be related to our findings regarding borrower characteristics. Indeed, 
the market values positively loan announcement by large firms with important sales, thus less 
opaque companies with sustained economic activity.  
A positive market response to bank loan announcement involving less local lenders is 
more  puzzling.  Indeed,  one  could  expect  the  opposite  as  local  lenders  presence  help  to 
mitigate the adverse consequences of informational asymmetries both between the borrower 
and the syndicate as well as within the syndicate (Berger et al. 2001). However, this effect is 
not systematically true as shown recently by Fungáčová et al. (2011). Hence, we can argue 
here that the larger presence of foreign lenders can be considered by the stock market as a 
better and/or more objective signal regarding deal and borrower quality. This argument is  
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even more appealing with respect to the recent fragility of French banks following the 2007-
2008 crisis
11.  
4.2.  Boom and bust results 
We  aim  now  at  investigating  more  in  details  stock  market  reaction  to  bank  loan 
announcements during the recent boom and bust cycle. We first represent graphically the 
evolution of the CAAR and CASAR [-1,0] over time in Figure 2. We observe a rather cyclical, 
even volatile, evolution of CAAR and CASAR over time with an overall decreasing trend. A 
breaking point seems to emerge around 2007 which corresponds to the year of the beginning 
of the financial turmoil. Hence we can suppose that stock market reaction, although cyclical 
and volatile, tends to exhibit a different pattern during boom and boost periods, in accordance 
with the literature on procyclicality (see sub-section 2.3). 
We now turn to the results provided in Table 4 where we repeat the same exercise as 
for Table 2 but this time distinguishing the pre- (No crisis) and post-crisis (Crisis) periods. First 
of all we remark that most of stock market reactions are negative, confirming results displayed 
in Table 2. Thus bank loan announcements are considered as a negative signal by investors. 
However, these reactions appear to be significant only during the crisis period as average 
CAAR  and  CASAR  are  statistically  different  from  0  mainly  for  the  [-2,0]  and  [-1,0]  event 
windows,  while  there  are  no  significant  market  reactions  during  the  no  crisis  period. 
Furthermore,  for  these  particular  event  windows,  both  CAAR  and  CASAR  are  statistically 
different regarding the sub-periods under investigation. Finally, in absolute value, CAAR and 
CASAR are overall larger during the crisis. For instance, the CAAR for the [-1,0] event window is 
more than 20 times larger during crisis than before.  It is also twice the CAAR for the full time 
period under investigation (2000-2009). Overall, we can claim that a bank loan announcement 
is perceived differently with respect to the economic environment (Crisis vs. No crisis) and that 
it was considered as a negative signal by market participants during the crisis period, while it 
                                                           
11 “What's  the  Matter  With  the  French  Banks?”,  The  Wall  Street  Journal,  13/9/2011;  “Moody's 
Downgrade: SocGen, Credit Agricole's Liquidity Problems Larger Than Greece”, Forbes, 14/9/2011  
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was not considered as a signal at all before the turmoil. Hence, bank loan announcements 
appear to be considered as bad news during a period of economic and financial turmoil.  
Although contrary to some of previous empirical findings, this result receives some 
support from recent research on the 2007-2008 crisis. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) and 
Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011) have shown that banks have relaxed their lending standards 
during the boom period leading to a deterioration of their loan portfolio’s quality. Even if de 
Haas and van Horen (2010) provide evidence on a “wake-up call” with increased screening and 
monitoring by banks during the bust period starting in 2007, our results tend to show that 
providing a loan to a borrower after the crisis is badly perceived by the stock market. This can 
be related to several issues. First, even with harder lending standards, investors can still doubt 
in the capacity of banks to identify valuable borrowers on the credit market. Second, we can 
also expect that on average, lower quality borrowers need to apply for bank loans, especially 
through credit lines (Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010). Third, we can also expect various conflicts 
of interests, such as between the shareholders and the debtholders as well as between minor 
and major shareholders, to be more sever during periods of economic downturn and increased 
uncertainty. One of the consequences of the reinforcement of such conflicts of interests can 
be a negative stock market perception of bank loan announcements. Nevertheless, a deeper 
investigation of these issues is needed to better understand these effects. 
Therefore,  we  first  perform  similar  tests  as  displayed  in  Table  3  but  this  time 
distinguishing the periods before and after the crisis. The results are provided in Table 5. First 
of all, we remark that there are significant differences regarding loan maturity and contractual 
features such as loan collateralization or covenants. Indeed, maturity is more than three times 
larger during crisis, and one out of three loan contracts are secured and have covenants, while 
these  features  are  only  present  for  less  than  20%  of  loans  before  the  crisis.  These  loan 
characteristics  tend  to  show  a  change  in  bank  behavior  during  the  crisis  due  to  increase 
borrower default risk, uncertainty and informational frictions. In particular, loan characteristics  
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aiming at reducing adverse selection (collateral) and moral hazard (covenants) problems are 
reinforced during the crisis period. Larger maturities imply also that banks provide longer term 
funding to dilute the cost of bank debt for borrowers even at the expense of larger spreads. 
These results are in line with the “wake-up call” argument provided by de Haas and van Horen 
(2010).  
We also remark that the only significant feature of the bank syndicate that changes 
significantly is the number of lenders, which is reduced by three banks during the crisis. This 
again confirms a change in bank behavior and is consistent with changes in loan characteristics 
as a smaller syndicate is better suited to cope with borrower monitoring and mitigating agency 
costs within the syndicate (Lee and Mullineaux 2004; Sufi 2007; Bosch and Steffen 2011). It can 
also be explained by the difficulties of financial institutions during that period and thus their 
weaker  willingness  to  fund  syndicated  loans.  Finally,  the  only  borrower  characteristic 
exhibiting  a  significant  (although  statistically  weak)  change  during  the  crisis  is  profitability 
which is twice larger than before.  
Finally, we investigate differences in loan, syndicate and borrower characteristics for 
positive and negative stock market reactions during and before the crisis (Table 6). Regarding 
loan characteristics, apart from loan size which exhibits similar features for positive CAAR as 
for the full sample (larger loans are associated with positive stock reaction), we remark that 
during the crisis, loans with larger spreads (+ 70 bps on average) and more tranches (+ 1 
tranche on average) were associated with a positive stock market reaction. It is also worth 
noticing that a positive reaction is associated with an average loan size of 1 billion USD during 
the crisis while the same is true for a 700 million USD loan before the crisis. The evidence is 
completely  inverted  for  spread:  before  the  crisis,  positive  reactions  are  related  to  lower 
spreads while they are associated with larger spreads during the crisis. 
The spread result can be analyzed within the Spence costly signal framework. In an 
environment plagued with greater uncertainty and thus informational asymmetry, the capacity  
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to pay a higher spread can be interpreted as a signal regarding the expected performance of 
the borrower. But we can also consider that the stock market perceives higher spreads as a 
signal of reinforced lending standards of the banks. This can be related to the latter result 
regarding the tranching of syndicated loans. Following recent evidence by Maskara (2010), 
multiple tranches actually create economic value and provide benefits for riskier borrower 
even if on average, the credit spread for a multi-tranches loan is larger. This is because without 
tranching, such spread would be even larger, eventually leading to adverse selection effects. 
We  also  observe  differences  regarding  bank  syndicate  features,  as  the  size  of  the 
syndicate and the number of arrangers are significantly different for positive and negative 
stock market reaction but only before the crisis. Larger syndicates with more arrangers are 
associated with positive CAAR according to the argument relating such syndicate structure 
with less informationally problematic deals and borrowers. Other syndicate features such as 
the percentage of local lenders or arrangers exhibit similar level of significance as for the full 
period (cf. Table 3). 
Finally, we also remark differences regarding borrower characteristics, especially for 
financial  ratios  such  as  common  equity  to  total  assets  during  the  crisis  period.  Indeed,  a 
positive stock market reaction is associated with loans to firms having a lower equity ratio. This 
can  appear  as  counterintuitive  because  less  capitalized  firms  can  be  considered  as  more 
fragile, especially during a crisis. However, we can also remind that the corollary of equity is 
debt which has been found to work as a signaling and disciplining device (Leland and Pyle 
1977; Ross 1977). Indeed, debt issuance is a positive signal, helping to solve adverse selection 
that results from information asymmetries between firm insiders and outsiders. Hence debt 
can be used by higher quality firms their quality. Moreover, a high-quality firm can issue more 
debt than a low-quality firm, because the issuance of debt leads to a higher probability of 
default due to debt-servicing costs. Debt can also reduce agency costs resulting from conflicts 
of interest between shareholders and managers as it increases the pressure on managers to  
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perform and stop wasting company resources and increase their effort by restricting the ‘free 
cash-flow’ at the disposal of managers (Jensen 1986). Other borrower characteristics such as 
size (measured by total assets or sales) exhibit similar significant levels by CAAR during crisis or 
no-crisis periods as for the full period (cf. Table 3). 
5.  Discussion 
We have empirically revisited the question of bank loans “specialness” taking advantage of the 
recent boom and bust cycle to provide a better understanding of stock market perception of 
bank loan announcements in the case of a major European country. Using a sample of 253 loan 
announcements  to  French  borrowers  from  January  2000  until  December  2009  we  have 
computed CAAR and CASAR for the whole period as well as for the boom and bust sub-periods. 
We  have  also  investigated  various  loan, syndicate and  borrower characteristics  that  could 
influence stock market reaction. 
  Regarding  the  full  sample  results  we  found  significant  and  negative  stock  market 
reaction to bank loan announcements. This first finding does not support the consensus of 
(positive)  bank  loan  specialness  first  provided  by  James  (1987)  but  rather  more  recent 
conclusions  by  Billett  et  al.  (2006).  In  our  case,  bank  loan  announcements  are  actually 
perceived  as  bad  news.  However,  we  also  document  which  loan,  syndicate  and  borrower 
characteristics are associated with a positive reaction. We find that larger loans funded by 
numerous lenders of which a smaller proportion is local banks to large borrowers are related 
to a positive abnormal return. This series of results is more in line with previous literature 
(Mosebach 1999; Lee and Mullineaux 2004; Sufi 2007; Bosch and Steffen 2011). We also find 
that  abnormal  returns  appear  to  be  cyclical  over  the  period  but  with  a  downward  trend 
starting in 2007. 
  We then investigate the effect of the recent boom and bust cycle on stock market 
perception of bank loan announcements. First of all we find that the average negative stock 
market reaction to bank loan announcements is essentially due to the loans provided during  
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the  bust  period,  from  2007  to  2009.  We  then  document  significant  changes  in  loan  and 
syndicated  features  before  and  after  the  crisis.  We  uncover  a  significant  change  in  bank 
lending behavior over the cycle, following notably recent evidence by de Haas and van Horen 
(2010). During the crisis period, loans have larger maturities, are more often secured and have 
covenants, and are funded by much smaller syndicates. These results clearly indicate a “wake-
up call” effect of the crisis on bank screening and monitoring activities, with the reinforcement 
of  contractual  (loan)  and  organizational  (syndicate)  features  aiming  at  mitigating  adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems during a period of greater uncertainty and risk. 
  Second, we look into the characteristics of loans, syndicates and borrowers that are 
related to positive and negative stock market reaction over the boom and bust cycle. We find 
that  larger  loan  spreads  and  multi-tranches  deals  are  associated  with  a  positive  market 
reaction  during  the  crisis.  We  interpret  the  spread  result  as  a  costly  signal  in  a  Spence 
framework while the economic value of tranching, especially for riskier borrowers, follows 
recent findings by Maskara (2010). We also uncover that a positive reaction during the crisis is 
associated with a borrower’s lower common equity ratio. We explain this result following 
signaling and disciplining roles of external debt (Leland and Pyle 1977; Ross 1977). 
  Overall,  our  findings  can  be  considered  as  questioning  bank  loans  specialness, 
especially in a period of crisis. However, several results also confirm established conclusions 
regarding the effects of such characteristics as loan and firm size or the structure of syndicates 
on stock market perception of bank loan announcements. We document a significant change 
in  bank  behavior  over  the  economic  cycle,  with  reactions  in  terms  of  loan  and  syndicate 
features  to  a  crisis  environment.  We  also  uncover  the  signaling  role  of  loan  spreads  and 
borrower financial structure as well as the economic advantages of loan tranching.  
However, more research needs to be done to better understand the question of bank 
specialness  in  the  current  economic  and  financial  environment.  In  particular,  multivariate 
analysis on a larger sample could shed more light on the issue of bank loans perception by  
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stock  markets.  Furthermore,  an  interesting  extension  would  be  to  consider  the  impact  of 
government  assistance  on  stock  market  perception  of  bank  loan  provided  by  financial 
institutions which received such support, following recent empirical evidence on the effect of 
government bailout on bank risk taking (Brei et al. 2011; Duchin and Sosyura 2011). 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for loan, bank syndicate and borrower characteristics (2000-2009) 
This table displays means and standard deviations for main loan, bank 
syndicate  and  borrower  characteristics.  Sample  period  is  2000  until 
2009. The number of observations varies because of data availability for 
particular  variables.  Data  source:  Bloomberg  Professional  Terminal 
Server. 
Variable  N  Mean  Std dev. 
Facility amount (MLN USD)  253  674,121  1 349,495 
Mean spread (bps)  135  128,801  103,780 
Mean maturity (years)  253  2,921  4,703 
Number of tranches  253  2,419  2,315 
Term loan dummy  253  0,509  0,500 
Revolving loan dummy  253  0,387  0,488 
Loan secured dummy  253  0,217  0,413 
Loan covenants dummy  253  0,233  0,423 
Number of lenders  253  8,565  7,945 
Number of arrangers  233  6,733  6,260 
Percent of French lenders  220  66,235  26,646 
Percent of French arrangers  209  64,844  27,970 
Percent of League table lenders  230  66,190  23,090 
Percent of League table arrangers  214  66,801  23,934 
Total assets (MLN USD)  200  40 045,630  198 298,210 
Total market value (MLN USD)  195  35 112,360  172 354,060 
Sales (MLN USD)  206  7 990,400  17 459,120 
Total debt / Total assets  200  34,082  21,854 
Total debt / Common equity  195  207,622  494,617 
Common equity / Total assets  200  28,322  24,433 
Ebitda / Total interest expenses  176  12,113  21,530 
Quick ratio  176  77,996  51,838 
Current ratio  176  134,936  89,671 
Operational margin  200  17,705  21,962 
Profitability margin  206  9,461  25,981 
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Table 2. CAAR and CASAR results (2000-2009) 
This  table  displays  CAAR  (cumulative  average  abnormal  return)  and 
CASAR  (cumulative  average  abnormal  standardized  return)  for  the 
selected seven event windows in the second and third columns. The 
percentage of positive CAAR is in the fourth column. ** and * indicate 
CAAR  CASAR  statistically  different  from  0  at  the  5%  and  10% 
confidence  level  according  to  Student  tests.  The  number  of  loan 
announcement events is 253. Sample period is 2000 until 2009. Data 
source: Bloomberg Professional Terminal Server. 
Event window  CAAR  CASAR  Percent of positive CAAR 
[0,0]  -0,3001**  -0,0961  0,3872 
[-1,1]  -0,3121  -0,0828  0,4587 
[-2,2]  -0,2622  -0,0456  0,4812 
[-2,0]  -0,2996  -0,0726*  0,4662 
[-1,0]  -0,3068*  -0,0938**  0,4812 
[0,1]  -0,3062  -0,0767  0,4098 















Table 3. Loan, bank syndicate and borrower characteristics by CAAR (2000-2009) 
This  table  displays  means  and  standard  deviations  for  main  loan,  bank  syndicate  and  borrower 
characteristics by positive and negative CAAR for the [-1,0] event window and the results of t-tests or 
chi-2 tests for the means. The latter is used for binomial test of proportion (dummy variables) while the 
former is used for Student tests of means (continuous variables). ***, ** and * indicate a statistically 
significant  difference  in  means  at  the  1%,  5%  and  10%  confidence  level  for  the  relevant  variables. 
Sample period is 2000 until 2009. Data source: Bloomberg Professional Terminal Server.  
  Positive CAAR [-1,0]  Negative CAAR [-1,0]   
Variable  Mean  Std dev.  Mean  Std dev.  Mean t-test or 
chi-2 test 
Facility amount (MLN 
USD) 
900,521  1 804,383  459,911  619,135  2,57** 
Mean spread (bps)  129,278  109,380  128,345  98,929  0,05 
Mean maturity (years)  2,861  4,096  2,978  5,229  0,2 
Number of tranches  2,552  2,615  2,292  1,994  0,89 
Term loan dummy  0,487  0,501  0,530  0,501  0,46 
Revolving loan dummy  0,406  0,493  0,369  0,484  0,37 
Loan secured dummy  0,235  0,426  0,200  0,401  0,47 
Loan covenants dummy  0,268  0,444  0,200  0,401  1,64 
Number of lenders  9,764  9,090  7,430  6,520  2,33** 
Number of arrangers  7,383  7,316  6,132  5,049  1,51 
Percent of French 
lenders 
60,708  26,104  71,469  26,202  3,05*** 
Percent of French 
arrangers 
58,306  27,724  70,842  26,948  3,31*** 
Percent of League table 
lenders 
65,030  22,670  67,271  23,518  0,73 
Percent of League table 
arrangers 
66,716  25,334  66,880  22,672  0,05 
Total assets (MLN USD)  70 860,070  280 611,410  11 026,210  29 199,330  2,09** 
Total market value (MLN 
USD) 
60 867,460  244 419,510  11 142,260  29 438,370  1,96* 
Sales (MLN USD)  11 849,140  22 575,270  4 488,950  9 796,820  2,98*** 
Total debt / Total assets  32,585  16,479  35,493  25,924  0,95 
Total debt / Common 
equity 
205,981  339,199  209,118  604,240  0,05 
Common equity / Total 
assets 
26,700  15,353  29,849  30,627  0,93 
Ebitda / Total interest 
expenses 
13,479  26,075  10,922  16,644  0,76 
Quick ratio  77,920  42,877  78,067  59,237  0,02 
Current ratio  130,329  50,224  139,239  115,075  0,67 
Operational margin  15,230  19,256  20,036  24,098  1,56 
Profitability margin  6,140  11,533  12,474  33,962  1,83* 







Table 4. CAAR and CASAR results over crisis vs. no crisis period 
This table displays CAAR (cumulative average abnormal return) and CASAR (cumulative average abnormal 
standardized return) for the selected seven event windows over crisis (2007-2009) and no crisis (2000-2006) 
periods. In the first two columns, ***, ** and * indicate CAAR and CASAR statistically different from 0 at the 
1%, 5% and 10% confidence level according to Student tests.  In the last two columns, ** and * indicate a 
statistically significant difference in means at the 5% and 10% confidence level for the CAAR and CASAR 
between the crisis and the no crisis periods.  
  Crisis  No crisis     
Event window  CAAR  CASAR  CAAR  CASAR  Mean t-test for 
CAAR 
Mean t-test for 
CASAR 
[0,0]  -0,4291*  -0,1558  -0,2066  -0,0500  0,75  0,83 
[-1,1]  -0,5909  -0,1589*  -0,0561  -0,0237  1,07  1,19 
[-2,2]  -0,2228  -0,0563  -0,2906  -0,0397  -0,11  0,15 
[-2,0]  -0,6025**  -0,1814***  0,0118  0,0127  1,74*  2,22** 
[-1,0]  -0,6458***  -0,2162***  0,0310  0,0032  2,29**  2,49** 
[0,1]  -0,3676  -0,0860  -0,3092  -0,0733  0,11  0,09 















Table 5. Loan, bank syndicate and borrower characteristics over crisis vs. no crisis period 
This  table  displays  means  and  standard  deviations  for  main  loan,  bank  syndicate  and  borrower 
characteristics by crisis (2007-2009) and no crisis (2000-2006) period and the results of t-tests or chi-2 
tests for the means. The latter is used for binomial test of proportion (dummy variables) while the 
former is used for Student tests of means (continuous variables). ***, ** and * indicate a statistically 
significant difference in means at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level for the relevant variables. Data 
source: Bloomberg Professional Terminal Server.  
  Crisis  No crisis   
Variable  Mean  Std dev.  Mean  Std dev.  Mean t-test or 
chi-2 test 
Facility amount (MLN USD)  731,750  1 717,186  632,565  1 009,220  -0,53 
Mean spread (bps)  139,690  114,370  123,884  98,890  -0,82 
Mean maturity (years)  4,844  6,486  1,535  1,820  -5,11*** 
Number of tranches  2,566  2,879  2,313  1,809  -0,80 
Term loan dummy  0,557  0,499  0,476  0,501  1,59 
Revolving loan dummy  0,330  0,473  0,429  0,497  2,51 
Loan secured dummy  0,292  0,457  0,163  0,371  6,04** 
Loan covenants dummy  0,311  0,465  0,177  0,383  6,22** 
Number of lenders  6,811  5,460  9,830  9,148  3,27*** 
Number of arrangers  6,505  5,128  6,880  6,903  0,47 
Percent of French lenders  69,475  26,307  64,035  26,750  -1,49 
Percent of French 
arrangers 
67,008  27,320  63,418  28,408  -0,91 
Percent of League table 
lenders 
68,121  22,187  64,926  23,657  -1,03 
Percent of League table 
arrangers 
69,435  23,273  65,101  24,289  -1,31 
Total assets (MLN USD)  59 408,280  275 540,020  26 309,740  115 456,080  -1,03 
Total market value (MLN 
USD) 
46 277,150  229 482,290  27 010,470  114 940,900  -0,7 
Sales (MLN USD)  9016,570  21949,030  7209,810  13107,110  -0,69 
Total debt / Total assets  35,768  17,665  32,887  24,399  -0,97 
Common equity / Total 
assets 
275,481  691,114  158,379  269,277  -0,5 
Total debt / Common 
equity 
29,262  15,260  27,656  29,300  -1,46 
Ebitda / Total interest 
expenses 
11,233  20,106  12,738  22,562  0,46 
Quick ratio  0,821  0,651  0,753  0,406  -0,78 
Current ratio  1,415  1,249  1,305  0,547  -0,69 
Operational margin  20,864  26,383  15,465  17,979  -1,62 
Profitability margin  13,153  31,168  6,653  20,918  -1,70* 
Return on assets  4,184  5,770  3,441  5,870  -0,89  
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Table 6. Loan, bank syndicate and borrower characteristics by CAAR over crisis vs. no crisis period 
This table displays means and standard deviations for main loan, bank syndicate and borrower characteristics by positive and negative CAAR for the [-1,0] 
event window and the results of t-tests or chi-2 tests for the means over crisis (2007-2009) and no crisis (2000-2006) periods. The chi-2 test is used for 
binomial test of proportion  (dummy variables) while the t-test is used  for Student tests of  means (continuous  variables).  ***, ** and * indicate a 
statistically significant difference in means at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level for the relevant variables. Data source: Bloomberg Professional 
Terminal Server.  
  Crisis  No crisis 
  Positive CAAR [-1,0]  Negative CAAR [-1,0]    Positive CAAR [-1,0]  Negative CAAR [-1,0]   
Variable  Mean  Std dev.  Mean  Std dev.  Mean t-test or 
chi-2 test 
Mean  Std dev.  Mean  Std dev.  Mean t-test or 
chi-2 test 
Facility amount (MLN 
USD) 
1088,200  2464,800  436,780  47,660  -1,80*  780,420  1213,200  478,550  716,470  -1,85* 
Mean spread (bps)  176,900  123,100  105,900  96,461  -2,09**  108,600  97,132  138,900  99,322  1,49 
Mean maturity (years)  4,937  5,668  4,768  7,142  -0,14  1,534  1,636  1,538  2,006  0,01 
Number of tranches  3,188  3,541  2,052  2,081  -1,96*  2,147  1,698  2,486  1,914  1,14 
Term loan dummy  0,612  0,492  0,509  0,504  0,80  0,414  0,497  0,517  0,503  2,42 
Revolving loan dummy  0,306  0,466  0,351  0,482  1,39  0,500  0,504  0,382  0,489  2,62 
Loan secured dummy  0,245  0,435  0,333  0,476  0,70  0,121  0,329  0,191  0,395  0,11 
Loan covenants dummy  0,286  0,456  0,333  0,476  0,75  0,207  0,409  0,157  0,366  1,39 
Number of lenders  6,854  5,348  6,776  5,598  -0,07  11,627  9,224  7,958  7,173  -2,49** 
Number of arrangers  6,425  5,073  6,569  5,220  0,13  7,917  8,292  5,814  4,935  -1,84* 
Percent of French 
lenders 
63,579  23,693  73,868  27,505  1,85*  59,127  27,380  69,496  25,135  2,25** 
Percent of French 
arrangers 
60,056  26,395  72,078  27,129  2,03**  57,364  28,572  69,870  26,991  2,52** 
Percent of League table 
lenders 
66,853  21,937  69,072  22,538  0,47  64,043  23,150  65,875  24,328  0,45 
Percent of League table 
arrangers 
71,211  23,056  68,102  23,588  -0,61  64,302  26,327  65,950  22,096  0,39  
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Table 6. continued 
  Crisis  No crisis 
  Positive CAAR [-1,0]  Negative CAAR [-1,0]    Positive CAAR [-1,0]  Negative CAAR [-1,0]   
Variable  Mean  Std dev.  Mean  Std dev.  Mean t-test or 
chi-2 test 
Mean  Std dev.  Mean  Std dev.  Mean t-test or 
chi-2 test 
Total assets (MLN USD)  122950  406523  8298,7  12197,3  -1,71*  38738  156639  13227,3  37714,2  -1,22 
Total market value (MLN 
USD) 
94142  337767  6921,6  9604,7  -1,57  39268,2  157051  14533,9  38413,3  -1,15 
Sales (MLN USD)  15717  31420  4024,1  7603,4  -2,25**  9399,5  14249,4  4904,9  11462,8  -1,88* 
Total debt / Total assets  33,79  15,792  37,359  19,061  0,91  31,842  16,978  33,988  30,447  0,47 
Common equity / Total 
assets 
23,938  15,269  33,545  13,991  2,99***  28,405  15,284  26,868  39,128  -0,28 
Total debt / Common 
equity 
240,2  327  303,1  880,2  0,45  184,4  347,8  131,9  151,9  -1,04 
Ebitda / Total interest 
expenses 
11,039  19,472  11,369  20,765  0,07  14,888  29,305  10,546  12,361  -0,98 
Quick ratio  0,758  0,389  0,869  0,8  0,77  0,791  0,453  0,712  0,349  -1,01 
Current ratio  1,257  0,464  1,537  1,612  1,04  1,33  0,525  1,279  0,572  -0,47 
Operational margin  16,66  24,376  24,245  27,69  1,31  14,349  15,451  16,64  20,38  0,68 
Profitability margin  4,766  12,197  19,403  38,812  1,53  7,011  11,109  6,276  27,859  -0,19 





Figure 1 Worldwide syndicated loans amounts and issues 
This figure displays the evolution of the yearly loan amounts (left scale) and number of issues (right 









Figure 2 CAAR and CASAR evolution over time 
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